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1. INTRoDUCrIoN
China's legal system would benefit greatly from the develop-
ment of a well-defined veil piercing doctrine, a tool that is cur-
rently unavailable to Chinese courts in all but the most limited of
circumstances. While China's reluctance to include such a doctrine
at earlier stages of development was understandable, its absence at
China's current level of economic and legal maturation is a notice-
able weakness in China's corporate law system. The gradual and
informal adoption of a piercing doctrine will strengthen China's
corporate law system making it more complete.
China, like many other jurisdictions,' has embraced and bene-
fited from the principle of limited liability for shareholders of a
corporate entity.2 The "corporate veil" is another term for this
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like
to thank my wife, family, Professor Jacques deLisle, Albert Cheng, Chiwei Huang,
and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Eco-
nomic Law.
I Such jurisdictions include the United States, Great Britain, and France.
2 See LEWIS D. SOLOMON Fr AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY: MATERIALS
AND PROBLEMS 241 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining the metaphorical phrase "piercing the
corporate veil" and listing factors that persuade courts to impose shareholder li-
ability); see also Robert C. Art & Minkang Gu, China Incorporated: The First Corpora-
tion Law of the People's Republic of China, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 273 (1995) (analyzing
China's Company Law of 1994); Company Law of the People's Republic of China
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principle that limits the liability of a corporation's shareholders so
that they shall not be held unconditionally liable for the debts and
obligations of the entity.
3
In most other jurisdictions, however, courts are provided with
the ability to disregard the corporate entity and thereby "pierce the
corporate veil" 4 in certain cases where abuse of the corporate entity
has been found.5 By piercing the corporate veil, the court can im-
pose "personal liability on otherwise immune corporate officers,
directors, and shareholders for the corporation's wrongful acts."
6
(1994) [hereinafter Company Law] (providing for the establishment of limited li-
ability entities in China), translated in 5 THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 1995, at 269-318 (1995); Chuan Roger Peng, Limited Liability in China, 10
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 263 (reviewing the concept of limited liability in China).
3 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "corporate veil:
[t]he legal assumption that the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its
shareholders, so that the shareholders are exempt from liability for the corpora-
tion's actions").
4 The term "piercing the corporate veil" became well known after Maurice
Wormser, a law professor at Fordham University, wrote his key article on the sub-
ject. See Maurice Wormser, Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity, 12 COLUM. L. REV.
496 (1912).
5 STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 1-28 (2001) (discussing
the doctrine as applied in the United States):
[I]n the present condition of the authorities, a corporation will be looked
upon by the courts as a legal personality, for ordinary purposes in eve-
ryday business transactions as a general principle and until adequate
reason to the contrary appears; but.., the fiction will be disregarded and
the law will look to see the men and facts behind the fiction whenever it
is employed to defraud creditors, to evade an existing obligation, to cir-
cumvent a statute, to achieve or perpetuate monopoly, or to protect
knavery and crime.
Id. (quoting Maurice Wormser); see Carsten Alting, Piercing the Corporate Veil in
American and German Law - Liability of Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View,
2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 187 (1995) (describing American law theories, ap-
proaches, and situations allowing piercing of the corporate veil); Robert B.
Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036
(1991) (evaluating cases through empirical analysis concerning the nature of the
parties and reasons for invoking the principle).
6 PRESSER, supra note 5, at 1-6.
The "veil" of the "corporate fiction," or the "artificial personality" of the
corporation is pierced, and the individual or corporate shareholder ex-
posed to corporate of personal liability, as the case may be, when a court
determines that the debt in question is not really a debt of the corpora-
tion, but ought, in fairness, to be viewed as a debt of the individual or
corporate shareholder or shareholders.
Id. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (7th ed. 1999) ("piercing the corporate veil:
[t]he judicial act of imposing liability on otherwise immune corporate officers, di-
rectors, and shareholders for the corporation's wrongful acts. Also termed disre-
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In China, despite exponential growth in corporate registrations and
concurrent increases in abuse,7 unlike other jurisdictions, the veil
piercing doctrine remains largely unavailable.
There is no doubt that corruption and abusive behavior is a
major problem in a rapidly transforming China. While a great deal
of the Chinese leadership's domestic support hinges on their abil-
ity to continue operating and managing a system that creates
wealth for their citizens,8 the party has been equally concerned
with maintaining a system that is considered fair by its partici-
pants.9 The development of a well-defined piercing doctrine, by
providing contract and tort victims harmed by abusive corporate
conduct with a means of redress, is one practical measure that can
be taken to make China's economic landscape more just.
Many factors dictate that a well-defined doctrine for piercing
the corporate veil be adopted in China gradually and using rela-
tively informal means. This approach is necessary because the
characteristics of the doctrine-its elusive nature,10 possibility for
abuse," and potential to frighten investors-coupled with the
unique character of China's currently emerging legal system-the
garding the corporate entity."). In China, the terms "jie kai gong simian sha" (pierc-
ing the corporate veil) and "gong si fa ren ge fou ren" (disregarding the corporate
entity) are used interchangeably to describe this judicial action in writings on this
topic.
7 See Chen Zhao Deng & Xiao Ling Feng, Fen Xi Gong Si Ren Ge Fou Ren Zhi
Du [Analyzing the System of Disregarding the Corporate Entity] (explaining that many
people in China currently exploit the corporate identity and limited liability to
engage in all types of improper business practices); Peng, supra note 2, at 277
("While 'briefcase companies' mushroom to take advantage of limited liability,
the enforcement of laws and regulations concerning enterprise responsibilities
and liabilities has so far not achieved a sufficiently high priority on the govern-
ment's agenda.").
8 See Xiong Yonggen, Rethinking Education, National Security and Social Stabil-
ity in China (Apr. 2001) ("Domestic economic development is the overarching fo-
cus of the Chinese government."), available at http://www.apcss.org
/Publications/Paper OcsnlXiong.pdf.
9 See XIAOBo Lu, CADRES AND CORRUPTION: THE ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLUTION
OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 190 (2000) (discussing the pervasiveness of offi-
cial corruption in China and noting that "from the very beginning of the reforms,
the problem of corruption was recognized as a serious challenge to the regime").
10 PRESSER, supra note 5, at 1-28.
11 See Peng, supra note 2, at 277-78 (noting that "even courts sometimes sur-
render to such pressures and disregard the limited liability protection provided in
the Company Law," and relating the story of a businessman who was held hos-
tage in his hotel room in a small town in China until he paid debts although he
was part of a limited liability company).
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limited number of professionally trained judges, 12 limited judicial
experience with the corporate form,13 ability for localism and cor-
ruption to pervade decisions14-would make the immediate
wholesale adoption of a broad piercing doctrine too unpredictable
and potentially disruptive to China's limited liability system. An
immediate and complete adoption would risk throwing confusion
into China's Company Law regime, undermining investors' confi-
dence in China's commitment to limited liability. It would also
have the potential of negatively impacting investment levels and
economic growth. 5
Such a gradual and evolutionary process is similar to the man-
ner in which veil piercing doctrines have been implemented in
other jurisdictions.' 6 In China's case, it would be best to gradually
introduce the doctrine by applying it narrowly to specific in-
stances, using it to address one particular type of abusive situation
at a time. In addition, the introduction of the doctrine should pro-
ceed in a relatively informal manner through non-legislative means
such as State Council guidance and Supreme Court explanations.
12 See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After Twenty Years,
20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 383, 397 (2000) ("The Chinese judicial system presents
many problems. The low educational level of China's judges creates significant
difficulties.").
13 See Peng, supra note 2, at 280 (stating that "[p]roblems exist in the en-
forcement of these economic laws and regulations and in the education of the gen-
eral public about the corporate entity and the role of limited liability").
14 See Lu, supra note 9, at 190 (describing official corruption during the recent
period of economic reform); Lubman, supra note 12, at 395 (remarking that "[t]he
strongest and most insidious type of extra-judicial influence on the outcomes of
non-criminal disputes is interference by local officials in pending litigation and in
the enforcement of judgments"); Roman Tomasic & Jian Fu, Company Law in
China, in COMPANY LAW IN EAST ASIA 138 (Roman Tomasic ed., 1999) [hereinafter
Company Law in China] ("Maintenance of central control in a system as large and
diverse as that of China must inevitably face serious problems of fragmentation or
what might be called 'centre-periphery' problems. This is especially evident
through the challenges to national authority provided by the forces of localism in
China's provinces and special economic zones.").
15 See, e.g., Ma Jing et. al., Er Shi Shi Ji Mou Zhong Guo Gong Si Fa Li Lun Yan
Jiu Jiu Zong Shu [A Summary of Theory and Research on China's Company Law at the
End of the 20th Century], in GONG Si FA Lu PING LuN (Corporate Law Review 2001)
210 (Gongyun Gu ed., 2001) [hereinafter Shanghai Corporate Law Review 2001]
(summarizing the recent thoughts of various scholars regarding the state of the
doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity in China).
16 See generally PRESSER, supra note 5, at 1-13 (presenting the "origin of equi-
table veil-piercing theory and the early evolution of scholarly approaches to the
problem" in the United States).
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While it is understandable that China might not have been
ready to introduce this doctrine when drafting the 1994 Company
Law, the chorus of Chinese scholars and commentators calling for
a more defined veil piercing doctrine has been increasing. Today,
after several years of experience with the principles of limited hi-
ability and in light of the number of unfair practices and abuses of
the corporate entity, China's corporate law system requires the in-
troduction of a piercing doctrine that will add strength and balance
to the Chinese corporate system.
This Comment will first discuss the relevant legislation and
other forms of guidance establishing the parameters of limited hi-
ability and piercing the corporate veil in China today. Several ju-
dicial decisions on the topic will also be considered. Next, this
Comment looks at the current debate among Chinese scholars con-
cerning abuse of the corporate form and the adoption of a piercing
doctrine in China. Finally, a case is made that China's company
law regime will benefit from the gradual and informal develop-
ment of a broader and better defined piercing doctrine ultimately
leading to the promulgation of appropriate legislation.
2. LIMITED LIABILITY AND PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN
CHINA TODAY
An analysis of relevant authorities in China shows that, except
for in the narrowest of circumstances, they provide courts with lit-
tle guidance for piercing the corporate veil in China today. As a
civil law country, there are several sources that help one to under-
stand limited liability and veil piercing in China. These include:
(1) legislation (i.e., Company Law of 1994 and the General Princi-
ples of Civil Law ("GPCL")); (2) interpretations issued by the Chi-
nese Supreme Court; and (3) publicly released judicial opinions. In
addition, the State Council and administrative agencies can issue
guidelines on certain issues.17 The guidance that the three enu-
merated sources provide in outlining the state of veil piercing in
China today will be discussed in turn in the next three Sections.
17 See generally Peter Howard Come, Creation and Application of Law in the
PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. LAW 369 (2002) (detailing the legislative hierarchy of the PRC
and the ways in which the law in China is often reinterpreted. Discussion of how
temporary administrative regulations or provisions are used by the State Council
to implement and add detail to "many of the matters left outstanding by the
higher law.").
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2.1. Legislation
In regard to legislation, both the Company Law of 1994 and the
General Principles of Civil Law provide the main contours of lim-
ited liability in China today.
Clearly modeled on other Western corporation laws, the Com-
pany Law of 199418 allows for the establishment of a legal person
with limited liability' 9 in China when minimum requirements for
registered capital are met and certain legal conditions are ful-
filled.20 The concept of limited liability for shareholders was a rela-
tively new one for China but its adoption is understandable in light
of the drafters' desire that the law "promote competition and pro-
ductivity" while also "countenance and even promote the devel-
opment of small private enterprises." 21
It should be noted that while limited liability for corporations
at the expense of creditors or tort victims had been long accepted
in the West, "[i]n China, which lacks a comparable history of orien-
18 Previous Company Laws have been enacted in China but have had little
effect on the way that businesses were organized. One Company Law was en-
acted during the Qing Dynasty in 1904, another during the Republican Period in
1914, and another when the Nationalists were in power in 1946. For a brief his-
tory of Company Law in China, see Company Law in China, supra note 14, at 138.
See also Art & Gu, supra note 2, at 274 (discussing the economic and historical con-
text of the Company Law as well as the purposes of the law).
19 The Company Law specifically contemplates two basic company forms,
the "limited liability company" and the "joint stock company" whose liabilities
are limited in the following manner:
In the case of a limited liability company shareholders shall assume li-
ability towards the company to the extent of their respective capital con-
tributions, and the company shall be liable for its debts to the extent of all
of its assets. In the case of a joint stock limited company, its total capital
shall be divided into equal shares, shareholders shall assume liability
towards the company to the extent of their respective shareholdings, and
the company shall be liable for its debts to the extent of its assets.
Company Law, supra note 2, art. 3.
20 See id. art. 8 ("Incorporation of limited liability companies or joint stock
limited companies must meet the conditions stipulated by the present Law."); id.,
Chapter II: Incorporation and Organizational Structure of Limited Liability Com-
panies (providing the conditions required for incorporation of a limited liability
company and minimum capital requirements for different categories of busi-
nesses, i.e., production, wholesale, retail, science and technology, etc.); id., Chapter
III: Incorporation and Organizational Structure of Joint Stock Limited Companies
(providing the conditions required for incorporation of a Joint Stock company and
minimum capital requirements for different categories of businesses, i.e., produc-
tion, wholesale, retail, science and technology, etc.).
21 Art & Gu, supra note 2, at 274-75.
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tation toward private enterprise, acceptance of limited liability
could not be presumed."22 Its adoption in the Company Law indi-
cates that China, like Western capitalist countries, was making a
decision that the benefits to society as a whole would outweigh the
cost to those who might be left without a remedy for contract and
tort claims.23
In Western jurisdictions, however, the externalities created by
embracing limited liability have been tamed by the adoption of a
piercing doctrine to hold shareholders personally liable in certain
cases of abuse. China's Company Law "explicitly protects share-
holders from liability beyond their capital contributions, and does
not mention 'piercing the corporate veil' or any other limitation on
shareholder immunity."24 In a sense, China's lack of a piercing
doctrine indicates that China has gone further than many jurisdic-
tions in the West in embracing limited liability at the expense of
those claimants left without a remedy for certain contract and tort
claims.
To be fair, the Company Law does provide certain limits to lim-
ited liability. Although there is no article directly speaking to the
piercing issue, legal liability is the topic of Chapter X,25 Articles 206
through 228, which provide penalties if a company violates the law
with respect to its registered capital, or acts unlawfully in any of
the other manners stipulated.26 However, these articles provide
22 Id. at 293.
23 See id. (discussing the adoption of the concept of limited liability in the
West).
The idea that those operating a business should be entitled to enjoy the
profits if it succeeds, but be insulated from liability for losses if it fails, is
neither intuitively appealing nor obvious. The concept inevitably denies
recovery not only to contract claimants but also to personal injury tort
victims when the company is bankrupt. Western capitalist countries de-
cided long ago that the benefits to society of encouraging commerce in
this manner outweighed the detriment to such claimants.
Id. See also Peng, supra note 2, at 268 (discussing China's inclusion of a limited li-
ability concept in the Company Law and noting that "[g]iven the failure to ad-
dress such a concept in the historic development of enterprise law in China, this
step indicates China's recognition that, in balancing the benefits of encouraging
commerce and entrepreneurship with the evils of the society bearing the costs of
externalities created by individuals, the former outweighs the latter").
24 Art & Gu, supra note 2, at 294.
25 See Company Law, supra note 2, Chapter X: Limited Liability.
26 See Zhang Xianchu, Piercing the Company Veil and Regulation of Companies in
China, in LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA: MARKEr ECONOMY AND LAw 132 (Wang
20021
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only for criminal and administrative penalties and therefore do not
provide an explicit cause of action for creditors or others who
might have been harmed by the violations stipulated in these arti-
cles.
27
Several articles of the General Principles of Civil Law of 1986
also touch on the issues of liability and piercing.28 GPCL Article 37
provides additional conditions that an organization must meet to
qualify as a legal person: "(a) it must be established according to
the law; (b) it must have the necessary property or funds;29 (c) it
must have its own name, organizational structure and premises;
(d) it must be able to independently assume civil duties."
30
Moreover, under GPCL Article 49, there are times when the
statutory representative of a legal person3' will be liable and sub-
ject to administrative and criminal liability where the legal person
carries out certain illegal activities. This includes situations in
which:
(a) the legal person has conducted illegal business opera-
tions beyond its registered scope of business; (b) the legal
Guiguo & Wei Zhenying eds., 1996) (discussing penalties under the Company
Law).
27 See Yan Ze Ping, Fa Ren Ren Ge Fou Ding Zhi Du Tan Xi [Learning About
Disregarding the Corporate Entity in China], LAWYER WORLD, Nov. 1998 (discussing
the current status of the doctrine for disregarding the corporate entity in China
and the author's suggestion for amendment to the relevant law).
28 See LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 225-49 (1983-1986) (providing
an English translation of the GPCL). See also Whitmore Grey & Henry R. Zheng,
General Principles of the People's Republic of China, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 715 (1986)
(providing another translation of the GPCL), available at LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
Chinalaw File No. 346 [hereinafter GPCL].
29 Company Law Articles 23 and 78 stipulate the minimum amounts of capi-
tal required for legal enterprises in different types of businesses. See Company
Law, supra note 2.
30 BING LING, CIVIL LAW 27 (2001) (stating:
The independent assumption of civil duties requires the legal person to
possess the necessary property and funds to carry out its activities. It
does not mean that a legal person shall discharge all the civil duties it
undertakes, but that it shall perform its civil duties with all of its own as-
sets),
available at http://personal.cityu.edu.hk/-lwbing/Research/CivilLaw.pdf (last
visited Jan. 20, 2002).
31 According to GPCL Article 38, the "statutory representative" of a legal
person is the person who has management authority and exercises authority on
behalf of the legal person according to the company charter or law. GPCL, supra
note 28, art. 38.
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person has willfully failed to disclose true information or
has resorted to deception in dealing with the tax or registra-
tion authorities; (c) the legal person has withdrawn funds
or concealed property to evade performance or an obliga-
tion; (d) the legal person has disposed of property without
authorization after being wound up, dissolved or declared
bankrupt; (e) the legal person has failed to apply for regis-
tration and make public announcements in a timely manner
at the time of its changes or termination, resulting in sig-
nificant loss to interested parties; (f) the legal person has
engaged in any other activities prohibited by law, resulting
in harm to state interests or public interest.32
This idea of a statutory representative of a legal person, is a
Chinese concept that could also be said to provide limits to the lim-
ited liability concept. While the punishment can be serious, it is
unlike piercing however, because the legal representative "is not
personally liable for corporate debts."33
GCPL Article 45 also requires minimum amounts of capital and
provides criminal penalties if these minimums are not main-
tained.34 Unfortunately, remedies under this article of the GCPL
are unsatisfactory to many of those harmed since penalties are
again only administrative or criminal in nature. None of the arti-
cles in the GCPL provide adequate protection or proper remedies
for those harmed in most of the situations in which the corporate
form is abused.35
The Company Law is generally viewed in China as a transitory
document in need of reform,36 and as such has generated contin-
ued discussion and debate. It is clear that further development of
32 The paraphrasing of this article of the GPCL comes from BING LING, supra
note 30, at 28.
33 Art & Gu, supra note 2, at 294.
34 GPCL, supra note 28, art. 45.
35 See infra Section 3.2 for a discussion of specific forms of abuse of the cor-
porate entity.
36 See Company Law in China, supra note 14, at 147 ("It seems inevitable that
China's Company Law will be subject to further reform as China gains more ex-
perience with the application of the existing legislation."); see also Zheng Juan Shi
Chang Zhi Du Chuang Xin Yu Gong Si Fa Xiu Gai Wan Shan Gao Ji Yan Tao Hui,
Fa Yan Zhai Yao [Summary of Speeches from the Seminar on New Ideas in the
Securities Market System and on the Revision and Perfection of the Company
Law] [Hereinafter Summary of Speeches] (discussing how to implement a more
developed security market and corporate governance system in China).
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the corporate law regime in China requires new solutions to ad-
dress the abuses that have been engendered by the limited liability
system.37 The systems inability to respond to these realities is
viewed as negatively affecting not only the interests of creditors
but also those of the corporate system and society as a whole.
38
While minimum capital requirements, the legal statutory represen-
tative of legal person, and the provisions for severe administrative
and criminal penalties do provide some limits to limited liability in
practice,39 the issue of piercing the corporate veil to get at the assets
of shareholders must be addressed to strengthen the corporate law
regime as a whole and balance the externalities created by China's
current approach to limited liability.40
2.2. Chinese Supreme Court Authority
Today, the key authority for piercing the corporate veil in
China is found in a narrowly tailored Supreme Court document is-
sued in 1994 as a response to a question presented by the higher
People's Court of Guangdong.41 In China, the Supreme Court42 has
started to take on a more "law-making and interpretive role,"
43
37 See generally Shanghai Corporate Law Review 2001, supra note 15, at 211
(stating that China should not avoid dealing with the problem of shareholders
abusing limited liability to harm creditors and the public interest).
38 See id. (discussing the meaning, application, and effect of a doctrine for
disregarding the corporate entity in China).
39 Peng, supra note 2, at 280 (discussing how the Company Law also contains
"significant limitations on the availability of limited liability protection to partici-
pants of commercial activities").
40 The situation in regard to legislation remains unchanged since Zhang
Xianchu published his article on this subject in 1996. See Zhang, supra note 26, at
133 (noting that with regard to the "legal scheme to prevent abuse of the company
entity ... most of the sanctions employed are of either administrative or criminal
nature and.., equitable remedy for company creditors in fraud or abuse situa-
tions beyond the capital contribution is not available under the present legisla-
tion.").
41 "On the Assumption of Civil Liability After an Enterprise Established by
Another Enterprise has been Closed Down or Gone Out of Business." Reply to
the High Court of Guangdong by the Supreme Court on Liability of Promoting
Enterprises for Their Terminated Enterprises on March 30, 1994 [hereinafter 1994
Supreme Court Reply].
42 See Company Law in China, supra note 14, at 140. (explaining that the Su-
preme People's Court stands at the pinnacle of the Chinese judicial system, below
which are the provincial level High People's Courts, city and prefecture based In-
termediate People's Courts, county and district level Local People's Courts, and
town and village level Local People's Courts' divisions).
43 See id. (providing an explanation of different types of legal authority in
China); Come, supra note 17, at 396 ("The issue of which bodies have the authority
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even though this role had been constitutionally delegated only to
the legislature. It fulfills this role in some instances by issuing re-
plies to questions asked of it by lower judicial entities of which this
is one example.
This document contemplates a situation in which one company
has established another and provides that after an enterprise has
gone out of business or been closed down, if the assets of the com-
pany are not great enough to satisfy its debts, then the enterprise
that established the company will assume civil liability to the ex-
tent that the amount of registered capital of that company exceeds
the actual capital contribution made to it. On the other hand, if no
capital was actually contributed to the terminated company, or the
amount was not sufficient according to the law, then the company
will be determined not to be a legal person and its full civil liability
will be assumed by the enterprise that established the company.
The reply further clarifies that in cases where the facts show
that a company did not meet the conditions required for registra-
tion as a legal person, the People's Court may request that the
company's business license be revoked. If the license is not re-
voked by the administration for industry and commerce, the Peo-
ple's Court may choose to disregard the legal person status of the
enterprise.44
This 1994 document has been criticized as being too narrowly
tailored 45 because it only deals with the situation in which capitali-
zation is insufficient or conditions for registration have not been
met, and does not provide guidance for cases in which a broader
piercing doctrine could be applied to reach the assets of a share-
holder where abuses of the corporate entity have nonetheless oc-
to interpret law is addressed in the PRC Constitution and in the Resolution on
Strengthening the Legal Interpretation of Laws .... In the resolution, [t]he NPC
delegated the power of statutory interpretation to the Supreme People's
Court...").
44 See 1994 Supreme Court Reply, supra note 41.
45 See Yan Ze Ping, supra note 27 (stating that the Supreme Court reply and
the relevant legislation are too narrow); Yan Hal Liu, Wo Guo Jian Li Gong Si Fa
Ren Ren Ge Fou Ren Zhi Du Tan Xi [Analysis of My Country's Development of
the System of Denial of the Legal Person], Zheng Fa Lun Cong [Commentaries on
Politics and Law], Apr. 10, 2001, at 23-26 (stating that while the relevant legisla-
tion and reply by the Supreme Court are fine, the law requires further gradual
development in a manner that is consistent with a civil law system and that is ap-
propriate for China's particular situation).
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curred.46 Examples of such abuse are discussed later in this Com-
ment.
Today, even with this 1994 Supreme Court document, Chinese
lawyers in Beijing and Shanghai complain that attorneys trying to
argue the facts of a case in which their client has been harmed by
abusive corporate machinations will have trouble finding any sup-
port to bring a veil piercing argument.47 A recent article on the
subject complains of China's narrow application of the piercing
doctrine and bemoans that, except in cases of insufficient capitali-
zation, China lacks the legal tools to rely on, making it difficult for
the courts to administer a piercing doctrine.48 Further explanations
by the Supreme Court would be helpful in providing courts with
guidance in cases where abuse has occurred.
2.3. Judicial Opinions
The opinions that have been released show that while courts
are sometimes willing to pierce the corporate veil, the doctrine has
been inconsistently applied and only in the most limited of situa-
tions.49 The cases clearly reflect the lack of guidance available on
the piercing issue in China.
It has been noted that in piercing cases, the Supreme Court
"has paid close attention not only to the issues of undercapitaliza-
46 BING LING, supra note 30, at 135 (explaining that in 1997 the Supreme Court
further noted that "a contract made by a party whose paid-up capital is below the
legal minimum amount for registered capital is not void but is enforceable against
the founder of that party").
47 Interviews with attorneys in Beijing and Shanghai (Dec. 2001 and Jan.
2002).
48 Jia Nie, Yi Ren Gong Si Ji Qi Ren Ge Fou Ding Yan Jiu [Research on One Man
Company and the Disregard of One Man Company Entity], CHONG QING DA XUE XUE
BAO: SHE KE BAN, Apr. 2000 (presenting author's comments and suggestions on
applying a doctrine for disregarding the corporate entity in the case of single
shareholder companies). Single shareholder companies are ostensibly not al-
lowed in China, except in the case of state-owned corporations.
49 In addition, it is difficult to fully analyze the scope and application of the
doctrine in China because the number of judicial opinions actually released is
quite limited. Although case law is not typically considered authoritative in a
civil law system, cases provide a sample look into how the legislation is applied
and are valuable. See Come, supra note 17, at 410 (noting that one of the ways in
which the Supreme People's Court issues its interpretations is through the "selec-
tion and publication of typical cases that have arisen in the lower courts... al-
though the Chinese legal system is part of the civil law tradition which does not
embrace the law of precedent, all interpretations are binding on the lower
courts").
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tion and benefit taking, but also the issues of control and fraud."5 0
For example, in one case, the Supreme Court confirmed a Guang-
dong high court decision to pierce the company's veil and order
the county government to repay the debts of a certain company
when it was found that the company was really an instrument of
the government and did not have any invested capital.
51
Similarly, the Supreme Court pierced a company's veil of lim-
ited liability and held a local government office liable52 where the
Supreme Court found that the company was registered by the said
local government although it had no capital of its own. In addi-
tion, the court found that the assets of this company were moved
to another company (established by the same government office)
just before a judgment on behalf of the creditor was to be exe-
cuted.53 In another case, the Supreme Court directed the high court
of Guangdong to find that an "upper level" state-owned enterprise
that was a minority shareholder in a certain subordinate company,
was liable for the debts of that subordinate where the upper-level
company was both liable for the wrongdoing and had made no
capital contribution.54
Another interesting piercing case involving the defrauding of a
creditor is the 1991 case, Rosin Factory of Wuzhou v. Huajian.55 In
this case the court found that the defendant company was nothing
more than "a shell company with no capital, no site for operations
and no ability to perform contracts" and that it did not meet the
50 Zhang, supra note 26, at 135.
51 See id. (discussing the case of Yue Hai Import-export Co. v. The People's
Government of Yang Chuen County (1992), from "Certain Opinions Concerning
Implementation of Company Registration Regulation of China" July 12, 1994. In
deciding to pierce in this case, Zhang notes that the court found it relevant here
that, after dissolution, all the company employees returned to the government
and that the government collected money from a debtor to the company.).
52 See id. (discussing the case of Ping Ding Branch of Shanxi Oil Co. v. Oil
Dev. Group of Bai City of Jilin (1991), from Economic Division of the Supreme
Court, Selected Economic Cases Heard by the Supreme Courts (1994)).
53 See id. (discussing the case of Ping Ding Branch of Shanxi Oil Co. v. Oil
Dev. Group of Bai City of Jilin (1991), from Economic Division of the Supreme
Court, Selected Economic Cases Heard by the Supreme Courts (1994)).
54 See id. at 136 (discussing the case of Union of Victory Oil Refinery v. Trad-
ing Group of Mei County of Guangdong (1992). The fact that the company signed
a contract with its creditor that was ultra vires and void and that it knew it could
not meet its obligation under the contract was a main reason the court chose to
pierce the company's veil in this case, according to Zhang Xianchu.).
55 Rosin Factory of Wuzhou v. Huajian Materials & Vill. Enter. Comnm'n. of
Jiangcheng, Guangdong (1991).
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conditions for a limited liability company.5 6 The company was
held liable for the full amount owed to the plaintiff. However,
since the company's sole investor and legal representative was un-
able to be found, the court placed liability on the Village Enterprise
Commission that improperly verified the information in the defen-
dant's business application up to the registered capital of the de-
fendant company as reported by the Commission.57 To what de-
gree, one wonders, was the existence of fraud in the facts the main
factor leading to the courts willingness to apply a piercing remedy?
Although it is difficult to obtain a picture of how the doctrine is
applied as a whole throughout China, through the sparse number
of judicial decisions that are released, the cases seem to indicate
that, except in the narrowest of circumstances, piercing is not often
employed. It is also interesting to note that most of the cases that
are heard and prevail are contract rather than torts cases.58
Most importantly, in cases where the use of a piercing doctrine
might be appropriate, other factors may stand in the way of its
proper usage. The common problems that might affect the out-
come of cases in China's judicial system today include the interfer-
ence of local Communist Party branches or government branches
that can slow proceedings and make the collection of evidence dif-
ficult; inexperienced judges; 59 and other pressures arising from lo-
cal protectionist tendencies.60 In addition, the inability of the judi-
56 Id. No laws or documents were specifically cited in this decision.
57 Id.
58 In other jurisdictions, it is usually more difficult to prevail on contract
cases than in torts because it is usually assumed that a creditor has the opportu-
nity to investigate and contract for the risks he is taking while a tort victim does
not have the benefit of this bargain. In China, while the situation has improved
somewhat in recent years, accurate information is not as readily available to credi-
tors making them more vulnerable than their counterparts in the United States. in
addition, torts cases are generally handled through other channels in China. See
Zhang, supra note 26, at 134 (stating that contracts disputes are the main part of
the cases handled by Chinese courts because labor, product liability, torts, bank-
ruptcy, and environment cases are often handled through administrative chan-
nels).
59 Lubman, supra note 12, at 397 ("The low educational level of China's
judges creates significant difficulties.").
60 See Zhang, supra note 26, at 137 ("To make the situation worse, local pro-
tectionism is also a factor hindering fair hearing of piercing actions."); see also
Lubman, supra note 12, at 395 (noting that "the strongest and most insidious type
of extra-judicial influence on the outcome of non-criminal disputes is interference
by local officials in pending litigation and in the enforcement of judgments");
Lubman, supra note 12, at 408 ("Critical weaknesses in staffing procedures at the
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ciary to enforce its judgments remains a current weakness of
China's judicial system.61 To immediately adopt a broad piercing
doctrine in such an environment could cause much confusion and
inconsistency in decision-making. These problems at the judicial
level dearly support the gradual and informal adoption of this
doctrine, a process that will assure its proper assimilation by
China's evolving judiciary.
3. TOWARDS A MORE COMPLETE COMPANY LAW REGIME: THE
ARGUMENT FOR A DEFINED VEIL PIERCING DOCTRINE IN CHINA
China's lack of a piercing doctrine has been a topic of debate
and discussion among Chinese scholars and legal commentators.
A survey of recent scholarly writings published in China indicates
that a majority of writers favor the adoption of some type of pierc-
ing doctrine, differing mainly on how it should be implemented
and in what cases. In particular, several recent articles have looked
to other countries to examine how they have handled problems of
corporate abuse in a limited liability system.62 The trend in corpo-
rate law worldwide, writes one commentator has been for most ju-
risdictions to adopt some type of piercing doctrine.63
The following Sections provide a general picture of the recent
discussion in China surrounding this issue. The types of abuses
that an effective piercing doctrine should address in China are pre-
sented in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2, the recent arguments made by
courts, poorly trained judges, overt localistic influence, and the absence of a con-
cept of independent adjudication further hobble the operations of the courts.").
61 See Lubman, supra note 12, at 395 ("'Local Protectionism' consistently
makes it difficult to enforce judgments of the courts when the successful litigants
must attempt to obtain payment in a place where defendants live or do busi-
ness.").
62 Ci Yun Zhu, Gong Si Fa Ren Ren Ge Fou Ren Fa Li Zai Mu Zi Gong Si
Zhong De Yun Yong [The Use of Disregard of the Corporate Entity in the Par-
ent/Subsidiary Context], FA LU KE XuE (XI BEI ZHENG FA XUE YUAN XUE BAO, Xi
AN), May 1998, at 40-46 (looking at veil piercing practices in the United States);
Ziyun Zhu, Tan Gong Si Fa Ren Ge Fou Ren Fa Li De Shi Yong Yao Jian (Discuss-
ing the Important Documents Concerning Disregarding the Corporate Personal-
ity), ZHONG Guo FA XUE UING) (Chinese Legal Studies (Beijing)), May 1998, at 73-
81 (looking at the piercing situation in the United States).
63 in Min Zhang, Gong Si Li Fa De Fa Zhan Qu Shi Ji Wo Guo Gong Si Fa
De Wan Shan [Trends in the Development of the Company Law and the Perfec-
tion of the Company Law], XIAN DAI FA XUE (CHONG QING)) (Modem Legal Stud-
ies, Chongqing), Feb. 2000, at 103-05 (discussing the present development of
China's Company Law and offering several suggestions for improvement of the
law).
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those opposed to the development of such a doctrine in China will
be presented. Section 3.3 explains the reasoning of those who sup-
port the development of the doctrine. Finally, Section 3.4 presents
views about how the doctrine might be implemented.
3.1. What Type of Abuse Might a Piercing Doctrine Address?
Of the many ways in which the corporate form can be abused,
some are common in many jurisdictions and others are unique to
China. Regarding those abuses that are unique to China, these
may be viewed as the "inevitable by-product of [China's] struggle
to turn a model of central planning economy under administrative
control for forty years to one based on market discipline." 64 Two
types of abuses mentioned in a 1996 article on this subject remain
relevant to a modern piercing doctrine for China.65 These include
situations where a claimant is harmed by: (1) companies that were
established by local Communist Party or government branches
without capital or with borrowed or insufficient funds; and (2)
when a company in distress establishes a minimum of one other
company and moves assets into the newly established company so
that the distressed company may be considered an "empty shell"
in liquidation. Companies also maintain old business registrations,
and then use these to escape from debts incurred by their so called
"new businesses," which are really operating in the same area of
business and with the same personnel.
66
More recent articles discussing the current Chinese environ-
ment have echoed some of the earlier concerns while adding a few
others. Articles have called for the use of some kind of piercing
doctrine to be used in the following situations:
(a) insufficient capitalization;67
(b) abuse by a single shareholder company;68
(c) mixing of assets and responsibilities among the corpora-
tion, its shareholders and related companies, making it eas-
64 Zhang, supra note 26, at 131.
65 Id. (discussing major types of abuse).
66 Id.
67 Yan Hai Liu, supra note 45 (defining the meaning of "insufficient capitali-
zation" in China and suggesting how to deal with this problem through piercing
the corporate veil).
68 Nie, supra note 48, at 80-82 (suggesting that China promulgate legislation
regarding the one company and disregarding the corporate personality of one
man entities).
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ier for the corporation to hide assets and avoid responsibil-
ity;69
(d) the situation in which the shareholder seriously interferes
with the operations of the company, so that the corporation
in fact becomes a puppet of the shareholder;70
(e) where the corporation acts unlawfully;71
(f) where the company operates as a shell, removing capital in
anticipation of times of distress and moving it to a newly
established company to avoid liability.72
These situations are common in Western capitalist countries and
are covered to different extents in different jurisdictions by veil
piercing.73
It has also been suggested that China should consider a type of
reverse piercing by which subsidiaries would take responsibility in
certain situations for the debts of the parent.74 One scholar has
even recommended the use of the doctrine in the environmental
tort context,75 a potentially enormous area of future disputes.
Lawyers in Shanghai mentioned recent, although ultimately un-
successful, attempts at using the piercing argument as a way for
minority shareholders to bring shareholder suits. 76
69 Yan Hai Liu, supra note 45 (describing the problems that occur when the
assets and responsibilities of the corporation are mixed among the corporation,
shareholders and related entities).
70 See id. (analyzing several examples of how this situation of shareholder in-
terference easily arises in the parent subsidiary context).
71 See id. (providing examples of unlawful behavior, including the establish-
ment of a corporation without following the rules in the Company Law, not hold-
ing shareholder or director meetings, shareholders using capital assets to pay per-
sonal bills, the insufficient keeping of financial and managerial records).
72 See id. (presenting examples of abuse in which capital is moved out of a
company resulting in harm to the corporation's creditors); see Deng & Feng, supra
note 7.
73 See Alting, supra note 5; Thompson, supra note 5.
74 Xiang Jun Kong, Cong Gong Si Tuo Ke Tao Zhai Kan Gong Si Ren Ge Fou Ren
De Shuang Chong Xing [Looking at the Dual Characteristics of Disregarding the Corpo-
rate Entity From the Perspective of Using Shell Companies to Avoid Debts], REN MIN FA
XuE BAO (JING) (PEOPLE'S LEGAL STuDiEs PAPER, BEIJING) Feb. 16, 1999 (encouraging
the use of reverse piercing in China and presenting an example of a case in which
reverse piercing might be employed).
73 Ji Mei Chen, Lun Mu Zi Gong Si Jie Gou Zhong You Xian Ze Ren Lan Yong De
Jiu Ji [Discussing Remedies for Abuse of Limited Liability in the Parent/Subsidiary Con-
text], HE BEI FA XuE [HE BEi LAW SCIENCE], Nov. 5, 2000 at 123-24 (introducing how
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in the common law system deals with
abuses of limited liability).
76 Interview with attorneys in Shanghai (Dec. 2001).
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One recent article discusses using the doctrine in regard to
multinational companies in China.77 Noting that piercing prob-
lems mainly arise in closed companies and corporate groups, the
doctrine is especially relevant in China, where many multination-
als have invested and opened subsidiaries. There is currently no
way for a creditor in China to pursue a claim against the parent
company based on a piercing theory.78 Even though it is difficult
to execute judgments overseas, the author believes that a well-
developed piercing doctrine in China will not only prevent abuse
by multinationals but also lead to foreign courts carrying out Chi-
nese piercing judgments.79 However, as the author correctly notes,
China is one of the world's largest recipients of foreign direct in-
vestment 0 and it should be careful to develop a doctrine that is
well-defined. Otherwise, investors may feel uncertain about the
level of risk to which their Chinese investments will expose them,
and might decrease their activity in China.81
The lack of published cases precludes an accurate survey of the
frequency with which courts deal with the above types of situa-
tions. However, anecdotal reports from Chinese attorneys and also
the concerns of scholars indicate that all of the abuses mentioned
above exist and are areas of current concern. China's company law
regime would benefit greatly from the introduction of a broader
veil piercing doctrine that would begin to cover some of the abuses
mentioned here.
3.2. Criticism of the Piercing Doctrine
While clearly a minority, not all scholars or practitioners are
proponents of developing a broader piercing doctrine in China.
Some scholars believe that the concept and logic inherent in the
77 Min Zhang, Kua Guo Gong Si Nei Mu Zi Gong Si Fa Ren Ge Fou Ding Ji Qi
Xian Shi Yi Yi [Disregarding of the Corporate Entity with Regard to Parent-Subsidiary
Corporate Personality Within A Multi-National Corporation, and Its Practical Signifi-
cance], Guo JI MAO YI WEN TI UOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE], Apr. 6, 2000, at
54-56 (introducing the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and discussing its
feasibility for China with regard to multinational companies).
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See Chris Giles, Asia-Pacific & International Economy: China Draws Foreign
Investors, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002 (stating that, for the first time, China has sur-
passed the United States as the most attractive destination for foreign direct in-
vestment).
81 Zhang, supra note 77, at 54-56 (discussing the importance of not negatively
effecting the level of foreign investment in China).
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idea of piercing the corporate veil are inherently confused.82 Oth-
ers do not believe that the theory can be properly applied at this
period in China's development, and moreover, that it is not a
"magic pill" that will solve the many problems and abuses of the
corporate system. It is felt by some that there are other and better
ways to deal with abuses of the corporate system. In addition, us-
ing the doctrine indiscriminately, where it does not belong, notes
one article, can lead to negative impact on investment and eco-
nomic growth.83
Among those who object to the theory behind piercing, it is ar-
gued that the doctrine has two main failings. First, the legal basis
for holding shareholders liable has not been verified, namely: Is
the shareholder liable for violating an agreement or for violating
rights? Second, unified standards or prerequisites for using the
doctrine have not been established. There is no standard for find-
ing: when someone is at fault, whether negligence is an appropri-
ate standard, whether damages must be proven, et cetera.84
Many of the reservations expressed by Chinese scholars about
the doctrine are neither new nor novel. In his treatise on the sub-
ject, Piercing The Corporate Veil, Stephen Presser notes that until re-
cently, few scholars had written on piercing because of the "doc-
trine's frustrating fluidity."85 He further notes that, "[s]cholars
who have examined the piercing the veil doctrine have seemed al-
most in despair, remarking that the rationales for piercing the veil
are 'vague and illusory', and that the jurisprudence of veil piercing
is a 'legal quagmire." 86 Presser also points out that authors of a re-
cent scholarly attempt to "impose order on the field," noted that
piercing the veil, "like lightning... is rare, severe, and unprinci-
pled. There is a consensus that the whole area of limited liability,
82 Shanghai Corporate Law Review 2001, supra note 15, at 212 (discussing
how some scholars feel the area of disregarding the corporate entity has some
theoretical contradictions and conceptual confusion).
83 See id. (discussing concerns of scholars in China regarding this doctrine),
citing Xin Zhong Zhao, Dui Wo Guo Shi Yong Gong Si Fa Ren Ren Ge Fou Ren Fa Li
De Zhi Yi, HE BEI FA XUE (HE BEI LAW SCIENCES) 105-107 (1994).
84 See id. (citing Jing Xia Shi, Mu Gong Si Dui Po Chan Zi Gong Si De Zhai Wu
Ren - Guan Yu "fie Kai Gong Si Mian Sha Li Lun De Tan Tan, FA XUE PING LUN, Issue
3).
85 PRESSER, supra note 5, § 1.01, at 1-7.
86 Id. See Ballantine on "Parent and Subsidiary Corporations," 14 CAL. L. REV. 15
(1925); Ballantine on Private Corporations at 34 (quoted in FREDERICK J. POWELL,
PARENT & SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF A PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE
OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SuBsIDIARY, at iv (Chicago, Callaghan and Co. 1931).
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and conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most
confusing in corporate law."87 Nonetheless, limited liability has
entrenched itself as an essential facet of the economies of Western
capitalist countries and along with this, the widespread and long-
standing adoption of piercing in Western capitalist countries indi-
cates that the benefits of both limited liability and piercing out-
weigh any confusion its adoption might create.
It is, however, this unpredictability that concerns many schol-
ars in China and makes them wary of unleashing such a potentially
powerful doctrine on a relatively inexperienced judiciary. There
are also concerns that localism and other forms of pressure could
bias local courts in their application of the doctrine.88 Even the
most ardent supporters of a broad piercing doctrine seem to be
aware of its elusive nature, the risks of it being abused and the
need to proceed with caution so as not to undermine the value of
the limited liability system.8 9 Such a result could of course have se-
rious negative consequences for economic vitality, growth, and in-
vestment (both domestic and foreign).
Some have suggested that it is precisely some of the most po-
litically powerful groups in China whose assets would be made
vulnerable by the implementation of a broad-based piercing doc-
trine. It is therefore viewed as political wrangling at the highest
levels that has kept this issue from being dealt with at the legisla-
tive level. While there may be some truth to this statement, it is
difficult to prove, and the concerns discussed above provide other
very plausible reasons that the doctrine has not yet been adopted
in China.
3.3. Support for Developing a Piercing Doctrine
Most scholars, while cognizant of the doctrine's weaknesses,
believe that on balance China will benefit from the introduction of
a defined veil piercing doctrine. Many believe that the larger
87 PRESSER, supra note 5, § 1.01, at 1-7. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. C-u. L. REv. 89 (1985).
88 See Introduction, supra Section 1 (discussing corruption, lack of properly
trained judges, etc.).
89 In fact, the thesis of Presser's book is that the increasing use of the piercing
doctrine in the United States is posing a real threat to the "integrity of the corpo-
rate entity," and that courts are not aware of the "delicate balance to be struck"
between the public goals of legislation that allows piercing and the "original pub-
lic policies of democracy and economic expansion which lay behind the creation
of state law doctrines of limited liability." PRESSER, supra note 5, § 1.06, at 1-74.
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threat to the validity of the corporate system in China is presented
by ignoring current abuses and neglecting to provide proper tools
to deal with these abusive and unfair practices. 90 While the veil
piercing doctrine is not perfect, this has not precluded its beneficial
use in many other jurisdictions and should not prevent China from
beginning to develop the doctrine to suit its own particular prob-
lems and characteristics.
It is a concern for justice and fairness that motivates many of
those that support the use of the doctrine in China.91 While Presser
expresses concerns about potential threats to the corporate entity in
the United States due to excessive piercing, in China it is the lack of
a more defined piercing doctrine that is seen as a threat to the
health of the corporate system. This concern is likely a reflection of
the abuses that exist in the economy of a rapidly transforming
China.
The call for reform in this area comes not only from academics
but also from those working in the judiciary. Discussing the opera-
tional weaknesses of China's Company Law at a recent seminar in
Beijing, a staff member of China's Supreme Court mentioned sev-
eral situations in which it is important to establish a mechanism by
which the veil of limited liability can be pierced and the negligent
shareholder would be held civilly liable.92 Even the courts recog-
90 See Shanghai Corporate Law Review 2001, supra note 15, at 210 (stating
that China must find a way to deal with abuses of limited liability).
91 As Maurice Wormser once wrote: "[1)n general a corporation must be
viewed as a personality, separate and distinct from its shareholders, whether in-
dividual or corporate, but this fiction, like any other fiction, must be employed
with common sense and applied so as to promote the ends of justice. It must not
be converted into a fetish." PRESSER, supra note 5, § 1.03[3], at 1-28.
92 See Wanhua Du, Speech as Vice Director of the Research Institute of the
People's Supreme Court, in Summary of Speeches, supra note 36.
Along with economic development, there have been more and more law-
suits. Company Law is basically just a law of corporate organization, it
lacks the operational facility and therefore it is hard to bring suit without
the guidance of additional Supreme Court explanations. One of the ur-
gent problems requiring judicial explanation is: piercing the veil. Some-
times an investor does not meet his investment duties, or the investment
does not meet the minimum requirement for registered capital OR did
not meet the requirements of the business license, or after the company
has been set up, the founder takes back the money, or using its control-
ling power to transfer subsidiary's assets (to parent), etc. If creditors file
suit, for now, they can only take the assets of the original company. Un-
der this condition, we should establish a system to pierce the corporate
veil and to make negligent shareholders directly liable for debts
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nize that justice today demands the tools to handle the increasing
number of cases in which innocent parties have been harmed by
illegal use of the corporate entity.
In addition, in early 2000, some representatives at the Shenzhen
People's Congress proposed that the Shenzhen congress should al-
low local judges to apply a veil piercing doctrine on a pilot basis.93
As a Special Economic Zone in China, Shenzhen often serves as an
incubator for new economic ideas in China. Such experimental
ideas can be introduced in Shenzhen owing to the special legisla-
tive powers held by the Shenzhen legislature. The fact that mem-
bers of this legislature proposed action on veil piercing indicates
their acknowledgement that beginning to experiment with the ap-
plication of veil piercing is necessary in China and that the time
has come for its introduction, at least on an experimental basis.
3.4. How China Should Develop a Piercing Doctrine
Given the complex nature of this doctrine, its potential for mis-
use, and China's current stage of judicial development, it is in
China's best interest that the doctrine be introduced gradually-by
dealing with different abuses in turn over time- and informally-
by issuing explanations and regulations to guide its use -allowing
adjustments as the success and problems of the doctrine in practice
become apparent. While China's earlier reluctance to implement
such a doctrine when first experimenting with limited liability
companies is understandable, at China's current stage of economic
and legal maturation the doctrine's absence is a noticeable anomaly
and one that the legislature and courts should begin to address.
However, the gradual approach, utilizing relatively informal
means, is necessary for providing the courts and others the time to
adapt to the doctrine while also adapting the doctrine to the special
characteristics of China's economic and legal landscape.
As recently mentioned by the Supreme Court staff member dis-
cussed in the previous Section and as others have suggested, fur-
Id. (speech originally delivered in Chinese, translated from Chinese by the au-
thor).
93 Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and
Now, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1 n.241 (discussing the recently proposed legisla-
tion, and citing Wang Li, Guanyu Jianyi You Renda Shouquan ShifaYuan Shixing
Faren Zige Fouren Zhidu De Yijian [Proposal on Authorizing the Courts by the
Shenzhen Congress to Apply the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil on A Pi-
lot Basis], at http://rdcwh.sz.gov.cn/RDconference/dhwj/gg06171.htm Uune 16,
2000) (last visited in Oct. 2002).
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ther Supreme Court explanations would be one method by which
the courts would be provided with guidance and the tools to han-
dle company law related cases, including those where piercing
might be a proper remedy.94 Similar to the approach taken in Ja-
pan, China could absorb the idea of piercing or disregard of corpo-
rate personality in certain situations-the gradualist approach.95
As in Japan, the Supreme Court should issue judicial cases and rul-
ings and distribute them to the lower court for guidance on how
they should be applied-the use of relatively informal means.
When the time is right, then the Company Law should be amended
to provide for piercing.96
For now, one scholar suggests, additional informal means
could be introduced by the passing of administrative regulations
by the State Council before new articles in the company law are
adopted.97 At the same time China should be careful not to
94 See Yan Hai Liu, supra note 45 (suggesting that the Supreme Court should
publish typical cases which people can use as a reference regarding when piercing
may be applicable); Wanhua Du, Speech as Vice Director of the Research Institute
of the People's Supreme Court, in Summary of Speeches, supra note 36 (explaining
that in order to help the courts to make their decisions it is necessary for there to
be made available more judicial explanations regarding the Company Law).
95 Hao Dong Shang, Gong Si You Xian Ze Ren Zhi Du Tan Xi (suggesting
that, as in Japan, China should first go through a transitional stage in which the
Supreme Court can set out elements of piercing actions and refer to other judicial
cases to establish the boundaries of a piercing doctrine in China), available at
http://www.allbright.lawyers.com.cn/lvbbs/shanghaodong.htm.
96 Shang, supra note 94 (suggesting separate articles to deal specifically in the
parent-subsidiary context. In Taiwan, there is also a sub-chapter of the Company
Law which deals specifically with the parent-subsidiary context. For now, he says
administrative regulations should be passed by the State Council before adopting
new articles in the Company Law.)
97 See Come, supra note 17, at 382 (analyzing ways in which the law is rein-
terpreted in China through temporary administrative regulations or provisions
provided by the State Council).
A resolution of the Standing Committee of the NPC [National People's
Congress], the Resolution Authorizing the State Council to Make Provi-
sional Regulations in Regard to Reform of the Economic System and
Opening to the Outside World ... authorized the State Council to make
temporary regulations relevant to economic reform .... Such legislation
is considered to be a form of 'quasi-law', enacted to regulate the current
situation in the absence of other legislation and intended as a means by
which to accumulate experience .... The ultimate intention is for the
NPC to itself draft legislation when the situation is considered "mature",
that is, when sufficient experience has been assembled, followed by the
invalidation of the temporary regulations.
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frighten foreign investors.98 Improvements in this area should be
introduced step by step given the importance of maintaining a
healthy level of economic growth and high levels of foreign in-
vestment to China. However, in light of the judiciary and legisla-
ture's silence on this issue for so many years and the importance of
creating and maintaining a just system, the initial steps should be
taken as soon as possible.
4. CoNCLUSION
In China, the ability to pierce the corporate veil and find liabil-
ity in certain cases of abuse is a necessary addition to the next stage
of development of China's corporate law system. While most ju-
risdictions have developed a doctrine of piercing by which the veil
of limited liability can be lifted and the assets of shareholders can
be reached in instances of abuse, China, for many reasons, has yet
to fully develop such a doctrine. Moreover, because of unique fac-
tors present at China's current stage of economic and legal devel-
opment and because of the nature of the doctrine, piercing should
be adopted gradually and through informal means at first.
As was done in Japan, China should begin by State Council
Explanations and by various Supreme Court interpretations before
finally promulgating the necessary legislation. It is a complicated
doctrine that has the potential to undermine the credibility of the
corporate entity and to frighten investors if not carefully and judi-
ciously employed. Therefore, the judiciary and the invest-
ment/business community should be given time to adjust to the
addition of this doctrine through its gradual introduction.99 This
gradualist approach implemented through relatively informal
means will provide the legislature with the time and feedback nec-
essary to create the appropriate doctrine and an equitable system
which more properly balances the competing aims of economic
development and justice.
In trying to implement the doctrine, it should be noted that
there is likely to be political resistance to supporting legislation
that might frighten investors, a potential that is especially real if
the doctrine is unpredictably and inconsistently applied. This re-
sistance will likely be reduced if the approach is more gradual and
98 Shang, supra note 94.
99 In this country, the doctrine also evolved over time. See PRESSER, supra
note 5.
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informal. It should be noted that these same concerns were present
as the doctrine developed in the United States.
While the doctrine has been developed in other jurisdictions,
the doctrine needs to be adopted to best handle China's particular
problems. As pointed out by one of the drafters of the Company
Law, there may be certain tests that have been applied and are util-
ized in other jurisdictions that will not be fully applicable in
China. 00 There are also issues of special concern in China, includ-
ing questions about the level of professional training of judges and
independence of the judiciary that must be considered in designing
a doctrine that will not itself become a tool for abuse.
The gradual adoption of a piercing doctrine through the use of
informal means in China is both necessary and welcome. Such an
improvement to the current situation will restore a balance to
China's economy and especially to those would be creditors and
tort claimants who can proceed with the knowledge that they may
have the possibility of redress in certain cases where the corporate
entity has been abused. It also has the potential of deterring many
of those who wish to use the corporate entity as a tool for abuse,
while providing a remedy for those who are victims to such unfair
practices. With the gradual development and promulgation of
opinions and guidance and eventually the passing of legislation,
investors will have time to become comfortable with the new situa-
tion, the judiciary can adjust to this exception to limited liability,
and the corporate law system will be strengthened.
100 Interview with Professor Jiang Ping, in Beijing (Jan. 2, 2002) (providing an
example of a case in which two companies were not necessarily controlled by the
same company because their offices were in the same building and their tele-
phone extension was the same. This test might be more useful in other countries,
but not in China where many companies share the same building and even the
same telephone switchboard).
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